Trump Rescinds the Biden AI Executive Order

As predicted, EO 14110 was rescinded on January 20 as part of a broader package of day-one revocations. Replacing it: a new executive order titled "Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence," which directs OSTP, the National Security Advisor, and the OMB Director to develop a new "Artificial Intelligence Action Plan" within 180 days. Until that plan lands, federal AI policy is, charitably, in limbo.

The legal question that has occupied us this week is not "what was rescinded" — that is largely as expected — but "what survives." The answer is more than you might think.

What's gone

The most consequential rescissions:

What survives

More survives than the day-one messaging implies:

The new EO's affirmative content

The new executive order is short — about three pages. Its substantive directives are limited:

  1. Identify and revise or rescind any agency action taken pursuant to EO 14110 that conflicts with the new EO's policy of "sustained American leadership in AI."
  2. Develop the AI Action Plan within 180 days.
  3. Suspend the OMB M-24-10 implementation pending replacement guidance within 60 days.

That's nearly the whole substantive content. The vagueness is deliberate; it gives the administration room to move while preserving optionality.

What this means for compliance

For most clients, near-term compliance posture is unchanged. The federal regulatory baseline is now lighter, but the durable constraints — EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, state AI laws, contractual flow-downs, sector-specific agency rules — remain. The federal pivot will mean less new federal regulation in 2025, not less regulation in total.

Two specific carve-outs:

What comes next

Three things to watch in the next 180 days:

  1. The composition and process of the AI Action Plan working group. Who leads it, who consults, and how open the process is will tell us a great deal about substantive direction.
  2. Replacement OMB guidance. The 60-day timeline is aggressive; expect slippage. The replacement will probably be lighter-touch but will need to address the basic question of how federal agencies make procurement and use decisions about AI tools, which the prior memo at least answered.
  3. Congressional reaction. Republican AI legislative interest is real but oriented differently than Democratic interest — more focus on China, more focus on innovation barriers, less focus on bias and safety. Expect bills, perhaps in defense authorization vehicles, that fill in some of the federal-policy vacuum from a different angle.

The next twelve months will see the federal-policy story slow down and the state-policy story accelerate. We covered the latter in November; we will return to it as 2025 state legislative sessions get going.